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Unita  'of  hunan  capi..tal-.aome  equipp€d  r,rrith utility  functions,  no  extra
charge.  This  characteristic  inseparability  of  human  and  human  capital  creates
significant  conplications  for  club  theorists.  For  a  variety  of  productlon
functions,  maxluizing  output  requires  clubs  that  mix  indiwiduals  with
different  human  capital  stocks.  On  the  other  hand,  r,zhen tastes  differ,
naxiurizing  utility  requlres  homogeneous clubs.  Therefore,  when people  musc
llve  and  work  in  the  sarne jurisdiction,  differences  in  hurnan capital
endo\^tments force  a  choice  betlreen  production  and  consumption  inefficiencies.
When the  production  inefficiencies  of  rnixing  types  outteigh  the  consumption
inefficiencies,  differences  in  hunan  capital  endorments  lead  to  mixed  clubs.
Eitan  Berglas  approaches  the  question  of  mlxed  clubs  in  his  1976  arlicle
"Discribution  of  Tastes  and  skills  and  the  provl-sion  of  Local  public  Goods."
In  Berglas'  model  there  are  tr^ro types  of  indiwid.uals,  each  endolred  \.,rith
different  tastas  and  types  of  hurnan capltal  .  The  two  uypes  of  human  capital
are  the  only  factors,  and  the  production  function  is  hornogeneous  of  degree  one
in  each  of  the  hurnan capital  types.  The  number  of  clubs  is  und.ef i-ned.
Berglas  sets  up  Ehe  model  so  that  che  two  human  capital  types  are  essential
complenents  in  produetion,  thereby  forcing  the  model  to  a  mixed  clubs
solution.
In  a  more  recent  article,  "Tastes,  Ski11s  and  Local  public  Goods.  "  Jan
BTueckner  (1989)  expands  on  BergLas,  model  Lo  anaLyze  clubs  in  \,.'hich  skill
types  are  complementary,  but  nonessential  ,  Brueckner,s  nodel  allorrs  the
homogeneous -  clubs  alrocatlon  to  be  optinal  .  He  finds  that  rnixed  clubs  pareto-2
dominate  homogeneous crubs  whenever  the  production  efflciencles  from  imperfect
labor  couplementar i ties  exceed  the  consulption  inefftclencles  of  rnlxlng.
Without  sorne labor  cornplementarities  ,  homogeneous  clubs  are  parelo-optinal  in
Brueckner's  model.
This  paper  expands Berglas'  and Brueckner,s  analysis  to  exanine  club
allocations  when hurnan  capital  endownents differ  and  skills  are  perfecu
substitutes.  The rnodel presented  here  also  differs  from  previous  work  by
restricting  the  number of  posslble  jurlsdictions  and by  introducing  land  into
the  analysis.  I  find  that  even when ski]ls  are  Derfect  substltutes.  nLxed
clubs  can  Pareto -  dornlnate  hornogeneous  clubs.
I  also  argue lhat  horlzontal  equity  is  necessary but  not  sufficienu  for
stability  when individuals  have Nash conjectures  and moving is  costless.  I
construct  additionar  stability  conditions  and find  chat  while  identical,  nixed
clubs  are  always  stabLe,  hornogeneous  clubs  become both  less  optimal  and less
stable  as  wages diverge  between jurisdictions.  Therefore,  when i.ndiwiduals
accumulate  hurnan  capital  ac  different  rates  over  tine  --  causing  the  human
capital  stocks  to  diverge  --  a homogeneous  -  clubs  allocation  generally  becomes
unstable.
Setting  up  the  I'lodel
Consider  a perfec t -  infornation  world  in  which  there  are  two
jurisdictions  and tno  types  of  ind.ividuals.  The jurisdtctlons  hawe identical
production  technorogies  and endowments of  Land.  ?he  social  planner  collects
all  rents  and  redistributes  then  to  residents  in  1_ump  suns.  Rents  need not  be
equally  dlstributed  between  the  two  types  of  persons,  but  a1l  individuals  of
tyPe  i  in  jurisdiction  j  must  be  treated  equally.  The t\^ro  types  of
individuals  are  distinguished  by  different  utiliry  functions  (denoted  u  and VJ
for  type  one  and  two,  respectively),  and  endo\,ments  of  human  capital  (denoted
ho  and hy,  respectively).  By  assurnption,  utllity  functions  are  concawe,
conlinuous,  and  Cwice  differentiable.  There  is  only  one  lype  of  human  capital
and  the  mlubers  .of.  tlzpe  1..  and  type.  .2  agents  are  equal  .
Labor  supply  for  both  types  is  fixed  at  one  tine  unit  per  person.
However,  firrns  pay  wages  that  depend  on  the  quantity  of  human  capital  offered.
Wage income  therefore  varies  according  to  type  within  each  jurisdiction.
Individuals  have  Nash  conjectures  about  the  wages  paid  to  human  capital,
the  goods  prlces  and  the  rent  rediscrlbutlon  function.  The  social  planner  can
make  transfers  beEween  jurisdictions  if  necessary  to  support  an  optimal
allocation.
Each  individual  rnust  rent  one  unit  of  land  (that  produces  no  utility)
and  all  individuals  must  be  located  in  one  of  the  tr,/o jurisdictions.
Following  Stiglirz  (1977)  the  roral  outpur  of  each  jurisdiction  can  be
used  either  for  private  consumpcion  (X)  or  for  public  consunption  (S).  Oucpuc
is  produced  fron  two  factors  --  land  (L)  and  hunan  capital  (g).  By
assumptlon,  the  production  function  is  continuous,  twice  differentiable,  and
homogeneous  of  degree  one,
The Social  Planning  problem
Subject  to  the  usual  constraints,  the  utilitarian  social  planner
maximizes eotal  urillty  (TU)
TU -  aN1U1  (x1u,S1) +BMlV1  (xrv,St)  +oN2U2(x2u,52)  +pM2V2(x2y,52)
where  the  subscripts  denote  the  jurisdicti.on;  Ni  indicates  the  number of  typeone  lndividual  in  jurisdiction  i;  M1 lndicates  the  number of  type  tno
lndlviduals  ln  jurisdiction  i;  x1.  indlcates  the  consumption  of  prlvate  good X
by  an  individual  of  type  j  in  jurisdiction  !  and the  a  and p  are  utiliry
weights  for.t)?e.one  and.t\do indivtdualsi  respectivety.  1  ...Le.u  c+p:l.  The
constraints  are  goods-clearing  constraints,
(1.1)  X1+X2 :  Nlxlu  +Mlxlv  +N2  x2u +M2  x2v
(1.2)  F(Hi,Li )  -  si  +xi  l-L,2
where  Hr-  Nihu  +Mr  hv  and Li:  L"  -p,  -M,  for  i:l  ,2.  Because there  are  an
equal  nurnber  of  agents  of  each type,  Nt +N2:  M1  +M2  -N.
Opttnallty  Condttions
The eonditions  for  optimality  under  these  speclfications  can be  diwided
into  two categories  --  eonditions  for  the  optinal  provision  of  goods within  a
jurlsdicti.on  and  conditions  for  the  opuimal  allocation  of  individuals  to
jurisdlctions.  Appendix  1 presents  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  that  lead  to
these  optimallty  conditions.
Ihe  rnarginal  condition  for  optinally  provlding  goods within  a
jurisdiction  is  the  expected Samuelson  (1954) condition.  The sr.rm  of  the
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utilitarian  framework  by  varying
therefore  equivalent  to  Berglas,
only  two jurisdictions.
Pareto  optirnum can be  described  in  this
che utllity  r,reights.  This  approaeh is
Pareto  optinization  approach  r,rhen  there  are)
The possibility  of  corner  solutions  complicates  the  optimal  assignmenc
of  indivlduals  to  Jurisdicrions.  Three types  of  allocatlons  night  arLse  --  an
allocation  lrith  trrro  homogeneous  clubs,  an allocation  with  one mixed  and one
homoganeous.  club,  .and an allocation  with  two  rnixed clubs.  Each case  will  be
analyzed  in  turn,  and  then  decision  rules  that  indicate  the  oDtlmar  case  under
varlous  circtrmstances will  be discussed.
In  all  cases,  the  optimal  allocation  of  individuals  to  lurisdlclions
requires  that
(3.1a)  TU :  cAu[Xr  + X2  -wlH1  +r1T1  -w2H2  +r2T2l
where  w,  and  rl  are  margtnal  productivity  wages  and  rents,  respectlvely,  in
jurisdiction  1,  Ti  :  Ni  + Mi,  and o.\s :  ply  is  the  marginal  utiLity  of
addltional  unlt  of  either  consumption  good,  adjusted  by  the  weight  of  each
type  in  the  social  welfare  function.
Because  the  production  function  (F)  ls  linearly  hornogeneous,  optimal
allocation  conditlon  3.la  reduces  to  the  requirement  that  tocal  rents  exceed
total  provision  of  public  goods  (assuming  non-satiation  and  positiwe
urilitv).2
(3.1b)  TU  -  olu[  (rr  + r2)L  -  31 -S,  ]
Although  the  social  planner will  collect  sufficient  rents  to  completely
r!  Fr  !vauE
who collects  all
be sufficient  to
landlords  were j-n the  node1, rather
of  the  rents,  condition  3.la  implvs
finance  the  focal  public  good ai  ihe
than  a  social  planner
that  a  tax  on rents  would
oPtimlrm,b
cover  the  cost  of  the  public  good,  some tax  or  transfer  mechanism stlll  nay  be
necessary  to  support  uhe optimal  allocat.ion.  Depending  on  the  utility
function,  the  landlord/social  planner  may need  to  redistribute  rent  income  to
one or  both  tlzpee.,of ..ind.lviduals.  The soc.ial  planner  also  may need  to  tax  the
wage incoma  of  one  type  of  individual  to  finance  a  subsidy  for  the  other  cype.
optimlzation  does not  require  equal  tax/transfer  treatments  for  the  tlro  types.
Not  all  allocations  that  satisfy  the  requirements  fof  optlmallty  will  be
stable  equilibria.  With  Nash conjectures  about  the  level  of  public  good
provided  and about  the  lr'age, rent  and  tax/transfer  functions,  stability
requires  rnore than  horizontal  equicy.  Iihen noving  costs  are  zero,  stability
requires  that  lndividuals  expect  higher  utility  in  their  assigned
Jurisdictlons  than  in  any other  feasible  jurisdiction,  including  jurisdictions
in  which no member  of  their  type  is  present.  In  each case,  the  conditions
under which optima  are  also  stabLe equilibria  will  be discussed,
Case I  -  T\ro Honoeeneous Clubs
Only  one  allocation  occurs  with  two homogeneous  clubs.  Fof  notational
simpllcity,  conslder  the  assignrnent  of  type  I  individuals  to  jurisdiction  1
and of  type  2  individuals  to  jurisdiction  2.  This  allocarion,  however, may not
be  stable -
Stablllty
iJhen moving  costs  are  zero,  the  types  rnust be  unab]e  to  increase  their
utility  by  changlng jurisdictions.  Orherwise,  the  allocation  rrill  nor  be
stable.  Therefore,  each type  must feceive  greater  utility  from  the  assigned
allocation  than  they  would expect  in  uhe other  jurisdiction.  In  other  words,stabllity  requires  thar  each  type  I  (2)  individual  expect  higher  utility  in  a
homogeneous  jurlsdiction  of  type  1  (2)  than  in  a homogeneous  Jurisdlctlon  of
type  2  (1)  individuals.  Thus,  assurnlng rnarginal  productivity  factor  pa)ruents
and Nash conj ect'res  €bout.the.level  of  the  pubric  good provided  and about  the
rent,  wage, and transfer  functions,  stability  requires  that
(4.1)  U1  (xru  ,  S.  )  2 U(x2y +w,  (h"  -\)  ,  52  )
(4.2)  V2(x2v,Sz)  > V(xru -wr(h"-\),Sr).
If  uhe,-hurnan  capital  endowments are  sufficiently  disparate,  or  the  relative
utillEy  elastlcities  suffieientLy  similar,  then  the  homogeneous  clubs
allocation  is  not  stable -  3
Case 2  -  One Mlxed  and One Honoseneous Club
Optlnaltty
The narginal  condltions  for  optimally  asslgning  individuals,  given  that
one of  the  jurisdictions  must be  a honogeneous club  (the  part ia1-ly-nixed  clubs
solution)  are
(3.1)  TU  -  clu[X1 + Xz -w1H1  +r1T1 -\^,2H2  +rzT2]
(5.1)  [Vl (x1y  ,  51  )  -V2  (x2e  ,  Sz  ) ]  :  ,\y  Ixr.1;  -dFrldM1  ]  -)u[xru  -0Fr/6yt2l
3 Moving  coscs  would. add  to  the  stablllty  of  the  homogeneous clubs
allocatlon.  If  rnowing  costs  were positiwe,  then  stability  would require  that
1+.fl  U1  (x1u,51)  > U(xzv  +w2  (h"-\),Sz)  -  c
<4.2)  Vr(x2y,52)  > V(xru -wr(h"-h,),si)  _ 
"
where  c  is  the  util  i ty -  denominated  moving  cost.where  tj  is  the  marginal  uttlity  of  x1.i  and  o),x-B).y.  This  specification
assumes  that  the  hornogeneous  club  will  be  of  type  2,  but  the  analysis  for  a
homogeneous  club  of  type  1  is  perfectly  s)mnetric.
Stabll  lty
l.ihen moving  cosls  are  zero,  the  t)pes  must  be  unable  to  increase  their
uttlity  by  changing  jurisdictions  or  else  the  allocation  will  not  be  stable.
Clearly,  this  requires  that  type  tr,ro individuals  receive  the  same  level  of
utility  in  each  jurLsdiction  (Vr:Vz).  The urility  requirement  of  the  type  I
individual  is  not  welr  specified,  however.  Brueckner  approaches  this  problen
by  cornparing  type  1,s  utility  in  the  internal  allocation  to  his  utility  in  a
homogeneous  allocation  of  type  1  individuals.  Such  a  conparlson  makes  sense
when  land  does  not  lirnit  the  size  or  number  of  allocations,  but  it  does  not
rnake sense  here.  A  homogeneous  allocation  of  type  I  indivld,uaLs  is  not  a
basls  for  conparison  ln  this  case,  and  therefore  comparing  the  utility  of  type
1  individuals  in  this  allocation  to  thelr  utility  in  a  homogeneous allocation
ttould  be  inappropriate.  Civen  that  the  allocation  will  hawe  one  mixed  and  one
homogeneous  c1ub,  the  planner  must  conpare  the  utility  of  the  type  1
individual  in  the  mixed  allocation  to  that  individual,s  expected  utility  in  a
hornogeneous  jurisdiction  of  type  2  individuals,  The  type  1  individual  roust
recelve  greater  utility  from  the  assigned  alLocation  than  he  would  expect  in
the  other  j ur i sdict  ion.
Assuming  marginal  productivity  factor  payments  and  Nash  conjectures
about  the  level  of  the  public  good  provided.  and  about  the  rent,  wage,  and
transfer  functions,  stability  requlres  that(5.3)  xrv  -wrh., +r1  :  xav -r{t2hv  +r2
(5.4)  U(x2u,Sr)  > U(xrv +w.(h"-\),sr)
(5.5)  V(xry,  S,  ) :  V(xzv,  S2  )
Idhere  r.J1  is  the  prevaillng  wage  in  the  hornogeneous  jurisdiction  and  w2  is  the
prevailing  wage  in  the  uixed  jurlsdiction.a
If  the  utility  function  ls  CES or  1og-linear,  then  V1-V2  inplies  ttrat
xtv-xzv  and  that  S1:S2.  Equation  5.2a  reduces  !o  a  requirement  that  the  type
2  individuals  be  distributed  so  as  Lo  maxlmize  transformed  output,  given  that
one-of  the  jurisdiction  will  be  homogeneous,  Further,  the  requirement  that  Sr:S2
reduces  the  stability  constraint  on  the  utlLity  of  type  I  individuals
" Again,  noving  costs  would  increase  the  stability  of  this  allocation.
If  moving costs  were positive,  then stabiliuy  would require  Ehat
!?.:"1  lx.u  -w1h,,  *r1  -  x2y  +w2\  -r2  | = 
" (5,4a)  U2  (xru,Sr) < U(xrv +wr(h"-h,),51)  -c
where c  is  again  the  utiLiLy-denoninated  costs  of  noving  between
Jurisdictions.10
(equation  5.4)  to  a  requirement  that
(5,3b)  xzu  )  Xzv  + wr(h"  - \),
Total  output  in  this  partially-mlxed  clubs  allocation  r,rlll  be  less  than
or  equal  to  total  output  !n  a  totally-rnixed  clubs  allocatlon,  because  the
partially  -ruixed allocation  represents  a conscrained verslon  of  the  totally-
nixed  allocation.  Under partial  mlxing,  only  the  type  of  individual  allocated
to  a homogeneous  jurisdiction  wilL  be allocated  for  productive  efficiency.
Case 3  -  Trgo  I'tixed  Clubs
Optlnallty
Assuring,  marginal  productivity  wages and rents,  the  marginal  condicions
for  optirnally  assigning  ind.ividuals  to  jurisdictions  (interior  solution)
reduce  to
(3.f)  TU :  d.\u[X1 + X2 -(w1H1 -rrTr)  -  (w"H2 _r2T2))
(6.1)  [V1  (x1y  ,  S1)  -V2  (x2v  ,  Sz  )  ]  -  IyIxry  -dF1/dM1  ]  -\ylx2y  -0F2/0t421
(6.2)  [U,  (x.u  ,  S,  )  -U2  (xru  ,  Sz  ) ]  -  .\ulx1u -dF1ldN1  I  -.\xIx2u _dF2ldN2]
where  Ij  !s  the  marginal  utility  of  xil  and  a.\x:ply.
Stabtlity
When moving  is  costless,  stability  requires  uhat  V1:V2  and U1-Uz.  s
Clearly,  not  a1l  allocations  that  satisfy  the  above  optlnality  conditions  are
'  Again,  sufficlent  moving coscs could  suslain  any optinal  allocation.l!
stable  equiribrla.  As an interior  sorution,  however, an identlcal  mixed-clubs
alloeation  is  both  optirnal  and stable,  regardless  of  the  utility
speciflcation.
Other  .allocat.ions  -c.an  be .both  stable  and optirnal  under  certain
conditions,  If  che utility  function  is  CES  or  log-linear,  then  the  equal
utility  constraint  requlres  that  the  level  of  private  good consuuption  for
each lype  be independent of  the  assigned jurlsdiction.  In  other  words,  x11 -
x2.i for  each type.  Conditions  6.1  and 6.2  therefore  reduce to  sinple
conditions  requiring  that  the  alLocacion  maxirnize cotaL  cons\[Dption
(Xr+X2+S1+S2  ) .
(6.Ia)  AFL/AV1-  :  dEz  / Ar42
(6.2a)  aFll3N1  -  AF2/AN1
Assuning  rnarginal  productivicy  wages and  rents,  equatlons  6.la  and 6.2a
further  reduce  to  sirnple  conditions  that  wages  and  rents  equalize  across  the
tlro  jurisdictions.
Choos  tne  Bet\reen Cases
To  identify  the  dorninant  case,  it  is  necessary  to  specify  the  utility
function.  The  following  exarnple using  log-linear  utiliry  functions
illustrates  the  conditions  under  which  each  of  the  above  cases  solves  the
social  planning  problern,
Let  the  utiliry  function  for  each  type  of  indiwid.ual  be  log-Llnear  such
thar  Ui:  {In(xru  )  +d  ln (  S,  )  and  Vr-filn(xiv)+aIn(Si).L2
Case  1
The  homogeneous  clubs  allocation  leads  to  the  following  consumpcion
allocations
xrr=adFr./N;  . xzz=BA4/Ni  €1:ad$r  ;  S2-peFT .
where  F,  :F1  +F,  ls  the  total  transformed  output  of  the  lwo  hornogeneous
jurisdi.ctions.  Total  consumption  in  jurisdiction  one  with  its  population  of
t)rpe  one  lndividuals  r^'ould  be  oF1 ,  while  total  consumption  in  jurisdiction  two
would  be  BF  .  Unless  by  chance  the  weights  (o  and  p)  are  proportionate  to  the
relative  hurnan capital  endowments,  this  allocation  r,rill  require  a  transfer  of
output  betlreen  jurlsdictions.
The  honogeneous  clubs  allocation  yields  the  foLlowing  level  of  total
util  ity
(8.1) TU-  NIo{ln(e{/N) +odln(cd)  +FQI\(7L/N)  +piLn(pr^)  +tn(Fr)].
This  lewel  of  utility  may be  inpossible  to  achieve,  however.  If  the
allocatlou  is  unstable,  then  agents  will  move out  of  their  assigned
jurisdictions,  and  the  allocation  will  dewolve  to  a  stable  equilibrium  which
night  yield  a  lower  level,  of  utllity.  As  discussed  above,  stabiliiy  requires
that  each  type  expect  lower  utility  in  the  ocher  jurisdiction  than  he  receives
in  the  assigned  jurisdiction.  Therefore,  equations  4.1  and  4.2  lead  to  the
following  stability  conditions  for  homogeneous  cLubs
(e.1)  at -U/e)  [ln(a{F1)  -  ln(BaFr+Nw2  (h"  -h-  )  )l+Lt]{oe  /pe) > o.
(9.2)  Ez  -G/A) []n(BAFr  )  -  ln(q/F,1  -Nw1  (h"-\))  l-Lr-(aT/pe)  > o.!J
Whenever  either  stabillry  condition  (equarion  9.L  ox  9,2)  is  viotared  the
allocation  degenerates  l-nto  a  heteroteneous  clubs  allocation,  even  if  the
hornogeneous  clubs  allocation  produces  more  tocal  utitity.
Case 2
The  allocation  r^'i  th  one  hornogeneous  club  and  one  mixed  club  lead.s  to  the
sane  allocation  rule  as  does  the  identical  rnixed-c1ubs  allocation.  However.
the  ldentical  rnlxed-clubs  allocation  produces  more  output  because  it  leads  to
a  productively  efficient  allocation  of  both  types  of  hurnan capital.  The
identlcal  rnixed-clubs  allocation  therefore  dominates  che  allocation  wlth  one
rnixed  and  one  hornogeneous  c1ub.
Case 3
The  ldenticaL  mixed-c1ubs  allocation  leads  to  the  following  consumpLion
allocation6
x.,-x21:ag2  i /N  ;  xrr-x""-  Bfi  z  F7n  ;  s,  :sr- (a  0  +  Be  )  t
where i-f1thu+hvlN/2,L-N).  This  alLocation  does not  require  any transfer  of
output  between jurisdictions,  and yields  the  following  level  of  total  utility
(8.2) ru:  NIcgrn(c//N)  +  (a0  +Ba  )rrl(o.l+po  )  -  k,o+pe)Ln(?)  +parn(palN)  +1n(2F)l
CondLtions  Under llhlch  Mtxed  Clubs  Donlnate  Honogeneous Clubs
The identical  mixed-c1ubs allocation  produces greater  total  utllity
whenever  the  output  gains  from  efficiently  allocating  the  human capital  Eypes
6 Because  the  identical  jurisdictions  allocation  is  both  optimal  and
stable  it  will  be  the  only  alLocation  considered  here.L4
exceed  the  consunption  inefficiencies  of  nixing.T  Equivalently,  the
identical  mixed-clubs  allocation  leads  to  greatef  total  utility  whenever  the
lndicator  function  I  (equation  l0)  is  positlve.
(10)  1 -((od +pA)ln(a0+BA)  -altn(Zqg) -peLneph ) + tln(2i)-rn(Fr) l.
The tenn  in  the  flrst  set  of  brackets  represents  the  utility  loss  from  mixing
\,rhile  the  teru  in  the  second  set  of  brackets  represents  the  productivity  gain
from  rnixine.
Comparative  Statlcs  of  the  Indtcator  Functlon
Comparative  statics  of  the  indicator  function  illustrate  intuitively
appealing  character  is lics  .
(11.1)  0r/6a  -  (0-e)rr'1.,e+pi)  -0Ln(2a0)  +eLnepT,
(rl-.2)  aI/ae  -  olrllol+pe  |  -aln(Zed)
(11.3)  ar/ae :  B]rnlo'l+pll  -pLn(zpe).
and,  assuming a constant  elasticity  form for  the  production  function  (F)
(11.4)  aI/ahi  -  €F  [(h"+h")-1 -F(lihr  ,L-N)/hiFr ]  i_u,v.
\.rhere €F :(aFrlAHl ) (HilFr ) .
ft  (PA>oe,  -  irnplying  either  rhar  the  planner  srrongly  favors  type  two
'  The identlcal  mixed-clubs  allocation  also  dorninates  the  hornogeneous
clubs  allocation  as  an  equilibrlum  (if  not  as  an optimum)  whenewer the
homogeneous  jurisdictlons  allocatlon  is  unstable.I)
indlviduals  (p>a)  ot  that  type  two  individuals  have  a  relatively  strong  taste
for  the  public  good (A>r)  (or  both)  -  then  increasing  rhe neight  placed  on
type  two  individuals  (p)  decreases  the  likelihood  of  an  inrerior  solution.
Intuitively,  .if',  the  soci.a.l-  ptraaner "favors  the  tlrpe  with  a relative  taste  for
the  publlc  good then  lncreasing  the  welght  given  to  the  favored  tJrpe makes an
lnterior  solution  less  likely,  ceteris  paribus.  Because the  consux0ption
inefficlency  from  rnixing  arises  frou  the  consunption  of  the  public  good,
favoring  the  type  \^'lth  a  tasre  for  the  public  good amplifies  rhe  inefficiency
in  the  vlew  of  the  planner.
Sinilarly,  changing  the  uEility  parameters  to  brlng  them closer  together
-either  by  decreasing  3 or  increasing  d when (Fd>cl)  or  by  increasing  D or
decreasing  0 when (p|<a0  )  -increases  the  likelihood  of  an interior  solutlon.
Intuiuively,  the  more sirni]ar  the  tastes  for  the  public  good (3  and d),  the
less  consrmption  inefficiency  from rnixing.
Assuming  that  the  rnarginal  productivity  of  land  is  positive,  bringing
the  hurnan  capital  endowments closer  together  reduces  the  likelihood  of  an
interior  allocation  (reduces  I).  Sirnilarly,  separating  the  hunan capital
endol,rtments  increases  the  likelihood  of  an interior  allocatlon  (lncreases  I).
Inuultively,  the  more dissirnilar  the  hurnan  capitaL  endowrnents, the  greater  the
productivicy  gain  from  efficiently  allocating  hurnan  capital  .
Inpltcatlons  of  the  Analysls  Over  Time
The research  presented  here  analyses
setting,  but  the  model also  lends  itself  to
rnodel, S represents  a generic  public  good,
Iet  hunan  capital  endownents  in  period  t  be
the  aLlocaEion  question  in  a  static
nulti-period  analysis.  In  the
Define  it  now as  schooling,  and
a  function  of  S  and  hi.  Assuningl6
conrlnuous  time,  h. (t):hl  (L) [6sr (t) ] .e
If  the  identical  mixed-clubs  allocarion  ls  optirual  ln  the  flrst  period,
then  all  indivlduals  recelwe  the  same Level  of  sehooling,  S.  The hr.ruan
capital  ratio  -lemains  constant  .  ovef -time;  implying  .that  .if  -che utility
functions  are  Iinearly  hornogeneous, or  log-Iinear,  then  the  sign  of  the
indicator  function  does not  change with  time.  Therefore,  for  these  utility
sPeclflcations,  lf  the  identlcal  mixed-clubs  allocatlon  is  oplimal  in  any
period  it  is  opllmal  in  all  subsequent periods.
0n  the  other  hand,  if  the  homogeneous  or  partial  ly -  rnixed clubs
allocation  ls  optimal  ln  the  first  period,  then  individuals  receive  different
lewe1s  of  schooling  and  the  human capital  stocks  diverge  over  time.  As  the
hunan capital  stocks  diverge,  the  productivity  gains  from  efficiently
allocating  hurnan  capital  increase.  rf  tastes  are  sufficiently  siroilar  so that
the  indicator  function  is  positive  at  the  maxinum level  of  productivity  gains,
then  the  identical  nixed-clubs  allocatlon  is  optirnal  in  the  long  run.
Even if  the  productlvity  gains  fron  rnixing  never  dominate  the  utility
costs,  the  identical  mlxed-c1ubs allocation  may still  dominate on stabil{tw
grounds.  As  the  hurnan  capital  stocks  diverge  over  time,  the  incentive  to  nove
from  the  assigned jurisdiction  to  the  other  jurisdiction  increases.  Appendix
2  illustrates  the  tirne-instability  of  homogeneous  -  c  lubs  allocatLons  when the
utility  functions  are  log  linear.
Concluslons
The research  presented  here  contributes  to  our  understandine  of  the  club
" This  functional  form  is  adapted from Lucas (1988)
consumption substitutes  for  Lucas, neasure of  labor  tirne
capital  acclunulation.  By assumption,  6Si(t)  >l .
Here,  schooling
set  aside  for  humanallocation  process  in  a  nurnber of  ways.  The analysis  demonstrates  that  human
capital  differences  can  lead  to  optimal  rnixed clubs  even when the  hunan
capital  stocks  of  each  type  are  perfect  substitutes.  The analysls  also
demonsttates  .that  when the.number  of  .j  uried.i.ctions  is  fixed,  an  allocation
with  identical,  rnixed cLubs  is  always  stable,  even  though  it  may not  be
oPtimal.  Finally,  the  analysis  explores  an additional  source  of  instabllitv
for  hornogeneous  clubs,  and demontrates  that  hornogeneous  clubs  tend  to  becorne
both  less  stable  and  less  optimal  as hunan capital  stocks  diverge.
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Appendix  I
The Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
Maximizlng  the  social  welfare  function  implies  naximizing  the  following
Lagranglan
L  -  cN1U1  +  pM1V1  *  cN2U2  +  pt'trzvz
+  I(Xt  +  Xa  -  Nixju  -  Mrxr.,  -  N2x2,  -  M2  x2,n  )
+  61(F(Hl ,Lr)  -  Sl  _ Xi)  +  62(F(H2,L2) _  52 _ X2)
+ a(Nl  + N2 _  M1 _ M2).
The  resulting  first-order  conditlons  are
(A.t)  .dL  t o -9!i:  r  L:L,z
d*r,.,  8xr,,
(A.2)  :oL  ,p-fl-r  i:L,2
dXtv  dXr,
(A.3)  .dL , oN, 8ut :  r",  6u,  :  6,  L-I  .z
dsi  - 
asr  ' 
dsi
(A.4)  dL:  6r:.\  L:L,z
oXr









FMi  Vi  -  tMr xiv  +  6  i  jF,  r,r, -  AMr :  o
dMr




+  t't,  ,-avle!!:  I i:7,2.
Adding equations  A.5  and A.5  for  both  jurisdictions  (evaluated  as equalitles)
yields  equation  A,7
(A.7)  laNlul  + pMjvj  + aN2U2  + BM2V2  ]
-  l[Nrxru  + Mixiv + Nrx2u  + M2x2,]
+r  ffi*,*tr",*ffin,*ffiu,  :o
The first  lerm  in  brackets  respresent.s  total  utility  lrhile  the  second  term  in
brackets  represents  total  consunptlon  of  the  private  good betr,reerr  the  tlro
Jurisdictions.  Therefore,  substituting  marginal  productlvity  rlrages  and rents
into  equatlon  A.7  ylelds  equation  3.la
(3.la)  TU -  alu[X1  + Xz -\^r1H1  +rlTt  'ti.z{z  +rz.Iz].20
Appendix  2
The Stability  of  Hornogeneous  Allocatlons  Across Time:
An ExampLe  Using Log-Linear  Utility
To illustrate  the  time-instability  of  homogeneous  clubs,  assume  that
utility  func^tions are  log-linear  such rhat  Ui-  Cln(xiu)+dIn(Si)  and
v_i-Aln(xlv)+eln(sr  ).  Undir  this  utiliry  specification,  sr*Af,  and Sr:pDF,
where  F1 -F1  +F2 is  the  tolal  uransformed  output  of  th.  Jro  homogeneous
jurisdlctions.  Therefore,  6,qr;:t,6oar,  anA tr",1t;:fr.Op?f".
Stability  requires  that  no  type  expect  greater  utility  in  the  other
jurisdiction  than  in  rhe  assigned Jurisdiction.  In  orher  words,  stabllity
conditions  9.1  and 9.2  must both  hold.
(9.1)  E" -{[ln(o{F1)-rn(BAFr+Nvz(h"-\)l]+ 0Ln(a0/p/^)
(9  .2)  t"  :A  [ln(paFr  )  -  ln(o/F1  -Nw1  (h"  -h-  )  )  ]  -  Al,:r,rc,e  /pA)
Differentlating  srability  condirions  9.1 and  9.2 wirh
> 0.
> 0.




N2w,  Iw1(h,.,-\ ) (€F  -  1) -\  (w1+w2  ) ]
IB0Fr+Nwz  (hu  -h" ) ]  Fr  €r
0  n"r\  t\^'2  (h" -\  ) (€F  -  1)  +h" (w1+w2  ) J
;il ladFr+Nw2  (hu  -  hv  ) lh" rr €r





IBArr  +Ni,r2  (h, -hl/) ]\Fr{r
lodFr +Nw2  (h" -h" ) I Fr €r
/  N2w2h"  [\(wr+w2)  -wr  (h" -h.,)  ({r -1) ]
at"
:  c"  [o/1  (h"-\)({p-L)-h"(w,  +w)]h!61q0-BAl
At
:  cv  ['z (h"-h-) ({p  -1)+h"  (w, +w)]hv6la|-pA)
ax2L
If  Sr  >  Sz  (Sz >  Sr)  then  evenrually,  h"  > \  (h,', > h,,)  and  the  hurnan
capital  stocks  diverge  over  rime.  If  St  >  Sz  @e-pe)  and  h,  )  h,1'  then
stabllity  condition  9.1  decreases over  tine  and (assuning  that  {  and $  ate  not
zero)  the  allocation  becomes  unstable.  If  52 >  51 and \  > hu  rhen srabiliEy
condition  9.2  decreases over  time  and aeain  the  allocation  beeomes  unstable.